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EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION MARKETS AND THE 
W ALRASIAN HYPOTHESIS' 
VERNON L. SMITH 
Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University 
THIS study reports on a block of experi-mental market sessions designed pri-
marily to provide (1) the severest test yet 
attempted of the equilibrating forces oper-
ating in competitive auction markets and 
(2) a more rigorously controlled test of the 
\Valrasian hypothesis.2 Some data are also 
supplied which show the effect of cash pay-
offs on the equilibrating behavior of such 
markets; in particular, the effect of full cash 
payoffs to all successful trading subjects as 
against payoffs to a subset of such subjects 
chosen at random. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIG~ AND SUBJECTS 
The supply and demand conditions un-
derlying the experimental design in this 
study were intentionally unconventional. 
In each experimental session, each of eleven 
subject buyers could purchase at most one 
unit of the fictitious commodity per trading 
period at a price not to exceed the limit price 
$4.20. Therefore, the demand per unit of 
time, or trading period, was perfectly elastic 
at $4.20 up to the maximum demand quan-
tity of eleven units. In each session each 
subject seller could sell at most one unit of 
the commodity at any price not below the 
given minimum reservation price $3.10. 
There \Vere thirteen such sellers in two ex-
perimental sessions, sixteen in two addition-
al experimental sessions, and nineteen in the 
1 The research reported in this paper \Vas sup-
ported hy National Science Foundation grants 
G-24199 and GS-370 to Purdue University. 
2 An earlier paper (V. L. Smith, "An Experimen-
tal Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Jmtr-
nal of Politiwl Economy, LXX [April, 1962], 126--34) 
seemed to provide sufficient evidence to warrant the 
tentative conclusion that a linear ver,;ion of the 
well-known Walrasian hypthesis of competitive 
market-adjustment behavior \Vas inferior to a linear 
test allernative called the "excess-rent hypothesis." 
final two markets. Therefore, the supply per 
trading period was perfectly elastic up to 
the maximum supply quantities of thirteen, 
sixteen, and nineteen units, respectively, in 
the three experimental treatments. 
Each session was begun with a general 
statement that the group was being asked 
to participate in a decision-making experi-
ment; that they would not be subjected to 
any unpleasant stimuli or experiences; and, 
furthermore, that they would have an op-
portunity to earn real money during their 
participation. Copies of instructions were 
passed out and read aloud to the entire 
group. 3 The payoff formula for each buyer 
in each trading period was $0.05 for making 
a contract plus the difference between his 
limit buy price and his contract price. Each 
seller received $0.05 for making a contract 
plus the difference between his contract 
price and his limit sell price. 
Each subject trader had initial informa-
tion only on his own limit price. 4 The addi-
tional information provided in the course of 
the market sessions consisted of the ordered 
public bids and oHers announced by the in-
dividual traders. Since the public acceptance 
of a bid or offer constituted a contract, each 
trader knew which bids and offers were 
3 The printed instructions given to each subject 
were reproduced in the Appendix to V. L. Smith, 
"Eilect of Market Organization on Competitive 
Equilibrium," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
LXXXVII (May, 1964), paragraphs 1-4, SSli, 
6SB, 199-20\. 
4 The same subjects held the same limit price 
cards in all trading periods, and this fact -.,.vas evi-
dent to all the subjects. They did not know that all 
buyers had the same limit prices, and all sellers had 
the ~arne limit prices. They were not told the number 
of buyers or the number of sellers, but they soon be-
came a"'arc, in successive trading periods, that 
there was excess supply at the end of each trading 
period. 
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accepted and which were not. Under these 
inf01mation conditions it is difficult to im-
agine a test of the equilibrium tendencies in 
auction 111:1rkcts that would be more severe 
than the design described above. In equilib-
rium, with these supply and demand condi-
tions, the entire rent in this market, ($4.20 
$3.10)11 ~ $12.10 per trading period, must 
be allocated to buyers! In full competitive 
equilibrium, c;cch seller vmuld receive only 
his "normal profLt" commission (Jf $0.05 per 
tr::msrtction, while huyers receive $1.15 per 
transaction, Under such cash-payoff condi~ 
tions one ,~~ould expect sellers to be very 
resistant io contract prices being forceJ 
trates the over-all experimental dedg::1 and 
indicates the rombimttion of exper:1r:entaJ 
conditions, course~ aJ1d fJUmbcr of subjects 
associ,o.tcd with c<Jch session. No subject p:tr-
ticip~cted in more than one of the 3essions. 
The .'>('Sskms were run scp:trately in eclr:h of 
t'.vo .scrit.:s sr~p;.trfltcd by several months. St:h-
jecis were given no advance \Vrr-:-ning that 
a1~ experiment was going to be pcrfurrncd in 
their chess, ~rnd nw experimental sessions 
discu:~scd in this JKtp<::r \'>·ere intermingled 
with ses;;;ions for entirely diflerf'nt experi-
ments. This proccd11rc was used to mini-
mize inform<~tion tr~;,nsfcr betwct::u subject 
groups.5 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS A:ND EXPERU.tEl\ l'AL f'O\il'liTIO"J" FOR EACH SESSION 
=====c==== .. =~-==,=~ 
EXo'CI!lM!<:,,;TAL 
SE:;<;IG-:-J J\o. 
Coursr 1 
Cour~w 2. 
Total sH1Jjt-:ds. 
e=2 
1 (N·--24) 
2 (N~24) 
48 
down to tbc $.1.10 cquilbrium. Thus, sup-
pose earh subject is assumed to have a 
utility funcLi•m for adrlitional income which 
is concave from below, and th11t an indi-
vidual's bargaining resistance is proportion-
al to marginnl utility. Then the nearer is 
price to the $3.10 equilibrium) the greater 
is seller resistance to a further rcrluction in 
price and the ;ve<Jker i.:> buyer resistance to 
an increase i:J. price. The question is w-hether 
the competition created by excess sellers 
will produce equilibrium even under this 
condition of exaggerated imbalance in the 
rental rewards to hargaining. 
The 162 subjects participating in these 
experiments .,.vcre Sophomore aud Junior 
students enrolled in three sections errch of 
two undergraduate coursrs in economics. 
One cotJrse w:Ls in.troductory economics, the 
other introductory economic tht-~OI')'. Two 
replications were run under each of the 
three valuefi, 2, 5, and 8 for the "treatment" 
variable, e ~·:: excess supply. Table 1 illus-
5 (N=.iO) 
6 (N ·-"'30) 
60 
R1 
81 
162 
F.XI'ERHrf:NTAL DATA 
Figures lA -1F1 corresponding io experi-
ment~.l :::;cssions 1_ .. 6, provide complete scricr; 
of cont.mcl prices in the order in which they 
\Vere executed in the four tradiq~ p~riods 
of e<~~ch ~.essim1 (six trading period-: of ses-
sion 1). Cash payoffs for the six sessions 
tot:~lcd $342 of whirh $281.70 rcprec;cnted 
the earnings of Uuy~rs, the rc:nainder being 
earned by sellers. fv1otivalion wa:::: excellent 
ln spite of the C:xtrcmc asymmetry in 
buyer H<"ld seller rent, it is seen that contract 
prices show r,. strong tendency to converge 
to the theoretical compctit·ive equilibrium. 
It i~; also cle<tr {r(l1r,_ these chart:; that the 
tendency to equilihrlwn is an i.nGcaslng 
function of e (:t precise measure of thi-:. tend-
ency i.s discu.sscd htr:~r in Table 2). In scs· 
sions 1 ;md 2 (e = 2), only six (Ontracts 
\Vcn; at equilibrium in trading perhlds 1--4; 
5 Sec :=mith, "Efiect o[ 1\hrkcct Or~~nizati0-:1 oa 
Compcti!i''"' Fquilibri\lm," op. rif., pp. 1q,l-13fJ 
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FIG. 1F.-Experimental session 6, e = 8 
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in session~ .) and 4 (e = S), twenty-seven 
contracts \W:re at equilibrium; in sessions 5 
and 6 (e ~-"' 8) there were thirty-seven such 
contracts. Two additional trading periods 
\vere run in (·xperimu11. 1 to see lf the addt'd 
trading experience \vould produce equilib· 
rium umkr the \Veak cqtlilibrating condi-
tion, e = 2. From Figure L1. thf: convt:rgence 
tcn(lcnrics continue in evidence, though 
\\'eakly 1 in trading periods 5 and 6. 
Session 2 shows the degree to ·which it 
nu'.y be possible for sellers 1o maintain prices 
above tXfL;iiibrium for comparatively long 
series of transactions when there ~\fC only 
two excess ~cllcrs in the markcL In this sec; .. 
sion a form of temporary t~cit co-opcr~tio-;J 
among se\krs produced a minimum prk{j 
line of $.1.50 until transaction 9 in pt·riorl 3. 
This co-op{:-"rativc set •vas then broken hy 
the seller •vho sold at $3.75 (yjelding a cash 
payotl of $0. 70) in period 1 and the.n f;1iled. 
to make a contract in period 2. R<Lthcr than 
fail agajn in period 3~ he sold at $3.40. This 1 
of course, akrtcd all buyers to the possi-
bility of m_!lking contracts he low $3.50, with 
the result that all remaining contracts in 
periods 3 and -1- '\vere at prices belovv- $.3.50. 
In the ahsr:nr:e of formal collusion and sidt; 
pa,yments 1 which were prohibited in these 
sessions, such tacit co-operatior:. is extreme-
ly ditlicu]t Lo maiutain. One "nervous" 
selkr may he sufficient to break the co-op-
erative set, <'.nd the probability of having 
at le<tst 01112 increases with c. Thus, \vith 
e = 5 and e ·--~ 8 in sessions 3-6, \VC see no 
such extensive "price lines:' being cstab-
lishcct above $3.10. 
From Figures 1 A and 1 B one might he 
tempted tu conJecture that the initial con·· 
tr<1.ct price \V;:tS highly signiftcant in deter-
mining the com·se of the market. The initi:cl 
contract in experiment 1 wa~ at $3.20, ami 
thereafter mosl contract pl"iccs 'i\'ere not hr 
from this level. Experiment 2 began at $3.50 
and did not fall hclO\v this level for some 
time. But experiment 6, as it happens, also 
began at $3.20 and rose much abovr this 
level for scvera.l transactions in spite of the 
brge excess supply of eight units. Similarly, 
experimt:11t 3 began at $3 .. 10 but prices be-
krved dilf'ctcntly thar: in cxpt'riment 2. 
Fir:-;t-~pr:riod co:-11:acts tend to If ..-eryerral-
i(__ and ::=.cn~;itivc ~o subt~e diHcrcnces in the 
dynamics of different subject grm:ps. Tht..: 
mnin tn:nrls that ran he rdateri to mdre 
trJditio11:Ll er.onomic v;uiahlcs .::n:erge more 
c\e::Lrly :.iter ~he first-period lecm·dng experi-
ence is •,·ompletcd. 
TESJ'S Of Tim \VA.LRA~IAN HYPOTI-msrs 
The maj<x aJl;-d_y~ical purpose of this 
paper is Lo test th;: \Valra~ian hypothesi~ 
(\Vl-1) <tgainst a test ;:dternative, th!-~ excess 
rent h~pothtsi~; (E.RH). As v:e use tlwrn 
here, \VJ{ refers to t.hc hypothesi~; that price 
tends to faH (rise) at a ro.te -,,·hk:l is pm--
porj_i,Jn:tl to the ;;xce~;-:-; supply (de;u:md) at 
any givf:n price rtnd ERI--1 rders to the hy~ 
pothf:sis that price tend:-> to fall c~·ise) at a 
r;-ttf.: proportinn;_d to excess economic rent at 
any gin-:n price, '"''here excess rent is me~ts­
urerl b~v the area bd•;<,recn the ·-supply :md 
demanfl curves _from i.hf: price in que~tinn 
Uown (c:- tlp) tCI ihc C•tuilibril:m price. In 
the _l)re:~enL ctesign) at the price Pt <~nd r,n 
excess Sllnply c, c.l\crss ren.t is e (Pr- 310). 
Th(: sip1iiic,l!KC of thi" rlesign i_s th~1t c be· 
comes a design consi:mt under experimental 
control :1.t all feasible contrad price:::.. Fur-
thermorc1 e is independent of ;vhich pa.-rtic-
1Jlar buyers and sellers :trc p:1ired in c?.ch 
con t n~ct. 
\Vc shonld note th:d no a priori comn:it-
mcnl to ERR is intended. It i-:, \\/H \-vhi~":h 
has a lor:g, ;,_n_d by f-:-c-epency of rcferer:re; 
perhaps a distinguished hi:Otory.·. You cmnot 
te:;t cm_y hyp<,thcsis except l>y :_·r_·fl"·enn: 1o 
a cmnpeting test alicrn3-tive 1 and ERH rep-
rc:-:.ent.~ s1Kh ;t plausible ,Lltern<J.tive. In this 
cxpcrime:n1al design, ER.H turn:. out to have 
:-l distinct intuiti\~c appeaL To ;;ec 1his, ir:.1-
aginc price being temporarjly "e:::tablishcd'~ 
at Pt" Jf this prirc were to pt?"rs\:o;t. in furtllf~.­
contrac~s, any seller failing to m::tke a con-
tmct ~tt p1 f;tands to forego £1_ profit (n~nt) 
equal tt_) p, - 310 cents. If e = 2, so that 
'\Ve tm:st have hvo sellers failing to make 
contracts, the tot:d polenti~tl lo:::;~ at p! is 
2(}:~--;i ~- 310). Under ElZH the ;·tssumption 
is th;,_t pricc-cntting occurs at a rate pro--
Copyright© 2001. All Rights Reseved. 
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portional to this potential monetary loss 
and is influenced both by the number of 
excess sellers and their individual potential 
losses. Thus, under ERR, the rate of price-
cutting diminishes as p1 falls and the poten-
tial loss decreases. In other words, if you 
have a lot to lose by failing to make a con-
tract, you are quick to undercut your com-
petitors in order to increase your chances of 
making a sale; if you have little to lose by 
failing to make a contract, you are slower 
to undercut your competitiors. Under \VH, 
~., 
EXCESS RENT 
HYPOTHESIS 
45"LINE 
a<O 
pO 
:-;peed coefficient under ERH, and Pt is the 
contract price on the tth transaction. \Vith 
this experimental design it is evident that 
the t\vo hypotheses have quite distinct em-
pirical implications. Phase lines for each of 
the two hypotheses arc shown in Figure 2 
for two levels of the control variable, e1 and 
e2, where e1 < e2• "G ndcr \VH the phase lines 
all have a slope of nnity, and increases in 
e simply shift these lines parallel to the 
right. Under ERH, the phase line has a 
slope less than unity and this slope is a de-
WALRASIAN 
HYPOTHESIS 
45" LINE 
fJ<O 
FIG. 2 
price-cutting is independent of such poten-
tial trading losses, dependir._g only on the 
constant excess supply on the market. 
1Iathematically, VVH implies an adjust-
ment equation of the following form: 
4.Pt+I = PtH - Pt 
l fJe + Ut+J, if p1 > p0 - (Je = Ut+1 1 1f p0 ~ Pt :S p0 - (Je, f3 < 0, (1) 
while ERH implies 
!!.Pt+l = Pt+l - Pt = ae(p, - p0) 
+ ~'t+l) a< 0, 
(2) 
where prJ = 310 is the theoretical equilib-
rium in cents, {3 is the adjustment speed co-
efficient under \VH, a is the adjustment 
creasing function of e as shown. It is seen 
that our peculiar experimental supply and 
demand design provides a relatively crucial 
test of WH as opposed to ERH. 
Using this analysis and the data froe1 the 
six experiments reported in the last section 
the test of WH against ERH is based upon 
the stochastic process defined by 
(3) 
+ a1(p, - p0)e+ fJ,e + ''· t+l, 
which is a general linear hypothesis contain-
ing both \VH and ERR as special polar 
cases. 
Table 2 shows the results of least-squares 
regression estimates of the coefficients of 
equations (1)-(3). Because of the "kink" in 
the phase line at p, = p0 - {3e (sec Fig. 2) 
implied by \\rH, the regressions were per-
Copyright© 2001. All Rights Reseved. 
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formed usillg- all the observations from the 
six expe:-im.:nts and again \vilh the obser-
vations 0 ~ ftt < 0.05 omhted. The second 
regression rcduc~s bias in favor of ERH by 
eliminating observations in the flat region 
of the kink. (;;Jdcr classical signifiCance tests 
we see in either case, from the standard 
error~ of a! and sl, that a] is quite signifi--
cantly different from zero, whcre<Ls {3 1 is not.6 
EYFECT (JJ! C..-\SH REV\.-AROS ON CO~>,.'I<:R(;r-;;.:"CC 
Bdore conducting 1he six expcrime:.1ts 
discusseU :tbove, i wo pilot e:x-perim~nL1l se.s · 
::;inr.s ·.~..-ere run. In the pilot sessions inste.G.d 
of pa~·~ng every buyer (seller) whry marie D 
cont.Ftf:t the differenr:e between hi~ contract 
price and his limit price plns .$0.03, this 
arnount was paid t(J four subjects se1er~er1 
at J·;_mdmn at the end of cuch trrtding peri-
RI\GRF5Sl01' ESTT!I-L'\Tf.S: \VH \-l~K:-FS ERH 
==-::-=-·· 
DilSFRV·\'nn_r; 
SFliSETS 
···-------.:..:.:.:.::.=_-:--·~.:._:_:_:_:_=-=-:-:-;--
"' 
-~~~=~=-::· ____ -1 
!'t:.l'' Pt I 
= .-.,,-t-.,_,(pl- j!")e 1- <l.~cl 
-------",--1------~:.:-~-----··:;~--
P1-c,-h 
·-· o:oJ- f- t?:•e+ "·<tl 
\Vith all oJ-..1 --------- - I 
stxvatinn~ --0_()134 -0.0226 0.21()8 O_,qJo -0.0213 
(iV.,.--=2:>9) (1.108) (0.0051) (0 i952) (0 . .'191) (0.0050) I 
-1.3317 
(0. 507) 
0.025R 
(0 l'Ji"2) 
\Vith o:~:;,_p~ 
<0 OS 
omitted. -0.7216 -0_020-1 0.1595 ~-0.2191 -0 flt85 I --0.9868 --D.2469 
__ :~~,-~_lx_''.f~i __ (1.6_l_S)--'-~(l~~73) ~(~~~~008) -------~~----~h_~-'_' ---'--(O.i!O-(i'--1_·_. -'---(~~~-~-~~--~ _(0_1. ~~~~!)) 
6l~ayesicm Report: If we assume n. uniform joint 
prior tlistribntion of n-1, fh, J.l-, and log o-.1', where J.l- ~"' 
a.ot + c.1(P£ ·-- p0)e +the, in equation 13), then, 
umler the ;:J.gsnmptions of I!Ormal n:gr{·s.'iion theory, 
the joilll posterio1· distribution 0f cq and .81 is hi-
variate norn:al, conditional on 0'2 with paramctt:rs 
a,.~ - o.0204, ,6, ~ 0.1595 
u(a,J ~ O.Oi3, uC1i,) ~ 0.3008, 
u~0.2109 
for the regression with J.V = 189. 
From these parameters and table;; •>f orr\lnatcs anrl 
cumulative Probabilities for the norm~d di:.:;trihution 
'\VC cmnput~, ".J;;ing H;tyes's th~:orcm, the following 
posterior exp.::rinwntal odJ.; fm·oring- ERJ-1 as 
against \YT:J: 
P(ERH) PO<a,<O,il,~,o) 
1' c win- ~ --.Nii;·<-(i~-;;; 6T-
P( --~-<al<Oji31=0)P(,d1=0) 
.P(!l,-< .. 6~-~ 0 ) !'(;;;-,;_: ())~­
> 300 
Th~~ odds favoring ERH arc o-;;er 300 to 1. 
orl. Tbi:~ reinforcement formula '.'':-t'3 made 
kwr,vr"t. to the SlJbjccts at tbe beginning of 
C;Jct of the piht S!:ssion::;. Expec~ed rc,v:;rris 
in tht'se sessions v.-ould, of c:our~T1 be iT.:1ch 
lmver J·han -,vtth ft~ll GlSh payolTs to llll tmd~ 
ing subjects. The objective w;J.~ t•J pr0vide 
a low-cost means of testing tht· mcchrmic~ 
of HH: {'Xperi.mental technit~uc prior to per .. 
fornting: the six an::1lysis session~ 0.nd In pro· 
vide t'A'O omtrol sessio':I.S with weak payoffs 
to dctrnniuc 1hc c-Fftd of reidorcerne:1t 
condition on convergence. 
T<-\b1e 3 provides least-squ::tn:s estimates 
of the pn:r:uuetcrs of equa.tion (4): 
TotH = .:tu ·+- (3u1ft + Ew, (4) 
wlw1-e rr" ---~ Pt - p0• If we dctl_ne 
lirn E( 1r,) -----E( rr ) , 
;-m oo 
:ts the r..xpectPd cteviatiou in cxpoir!.lental 
equilibriut!l price hom the the,Jrr~tical equi-
librium, 1hcn it is readily shmvn thA.t7 E(-rr'O'l) 
7 Cf. "Effect of J\hrket Organiz::tti.on," op. dt., p. 
lD--1-. 
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= a0/(1 - {30). Estimates of E(7rm) are also 
contained in Table 3. It is seen that under 
the full payoff condition the experimental 
market equilibrium is only 4.5 cents below 
the theoretical, for e = 2, and 4.3 cents 
above it for e = 5, as conpared with a 
discrepancy of 26.4 and 13.8, respectively, 
under weak payoffs. A t-test on the <10 for 
weak payoffs shmvs no to be significantly 
above zero for e = 2, 1(2) = 1.95, but not 
fore = 5, 1(5) = 0.99. With full payoffs un-
der neither condition of excess supply is do 
significantly different from zero, t(2) = 
the rental rewards to buyers as opposed to 
sellers. These tendencies are weakest when 
excess supply is small, strongest when ex-
cess supply is large. This conclusion, and 
the results on \vhich it is based, assume the 
information conditions under which our ex-
perimental markets were operated and 
should not be assumed without further in-
quiry to hold under different information 
conditions. 8 
A test of WH as against ERH yields 
strong support for the latter. The credibility 
of this conclusion is strengthened by the 
TABLE 3 
Cm.rPARISON OF FULL VERSUS WEAK (RANDOM) PAYOFFS 
----- ------- -- ----- ---------
Excess Experiment ;;_o"' 
"" 
;o No. Ob- E(,.. 00 ) Supply, R servation~ 
-------------- --------------------------
1, 2; full payoff -0.188 
2 (2. 435) 
A; weak payoff 5. 753 
(2. 960) 
3, 4; full payoff 0.528 
.I (1329) 
B; weak payoff 2.079 
(2.110) 
*Standard errors are sbmvn in pan·ntheses. 
-0.087, t(5) = 0.40. An F-test comparison 
of the estimates G-2 under weak and full 
cash payoffs shows the difierences to be 
highly significant (a< 0.005) fore= 2, but 
insignificant for e = 5. \Ve conclude that 
there exist some conditions under which ex-
perimental results are likely to be biased to 
an important degree by the substitution of 
random for full cash payoffs. Consequently, 
the use of random payoffs cc.nnot genera1ly 
be defended as a compromise between no 
payoffs and full cash payoffs. 
SUMJI.1:ARY 
The results of our six experimental ~es­
sions tend to support the vie\"'' that the 
auction-market mechanism prcx1uces strong 
competitive equilibrating tendencies, even 
under conditions of extreme imbalance in 
0.9584 6.207 100 - 4.52 (0.0367) 
0. 7820 12.885 58 26.4 (0.09.19) 
0.8769 8.801 79 4.29 (0.0461) 
0.8491 8.455 50 13.8 (0.0676) 
fact that the experimental design wos deter-
mined by the objective of providing good 
discrimination between the competing hy-
potheses. 
The experimental sessions under full cash 
payoffs to all subjects were compared with 
two pilot sessions under full cash payoffs to 
only a subset of subjects chosen at random. 
The results show enough difference in mar-
ket behavior to suggest that one should not 
arbitrarily substitute random payofl re-
wards for full payoff rewards, on the as-
sumption that the results will not be signifi-
cantly altered. 
8 See L. Fouraker and S. Siegel, Bargaining Be-
havior (New York: ~lcGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), 
pp. 142-51, 184-93, for a discussion of the effect of 
amount of information on oligopoly bargaining be-
havior. 
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